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can duplicate? 
Bhupinder Singh Anand 
In a review of Roger Penrose's "Shadows of the Mind", David Chalmers opined as 
implausible that there could be parts of our arithmetical competence that no sound 
formal system could ever duplicate. We prove, however, that the recursive number-
theoretic relation x=Sb(y 19|Z(y)) - which is algorithmically verifiable since the 
recursive function Sb(y 19|Z(y)) is Turing-computable - cannot be introduced through 
definition in any consistent formal system of Arithmetic. 
Introduction 
In a review of Roger Penrose's "Shadows of the Mind" [Pe94], David Chalmers 
remarked ([Ch95], §2.5):  
"... I have some sympathy with Penrose's idea that we have an underlying sound 
competence, even if our performance sometimes goes astray. But further, it seems to 
me that to hold that this is the only problem in Penrose's argument would be to 
concede too much power to the argument. It would follow, for example, that there 
are parts of our arithmetical competence that no sound formal system could ever 
duplicate; it would seem that our unsoundness would be essential to our capacity to 
see the truth of Gödel sentences, for example. This would be a remarkably strong 
conclusion, and does not seem at all plausible to me".  
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The question arises: Is there a number-theoretic relation that is algorithmically verifiable 
- and can thus be viewed as "part of our arithmetical competence" - but which cannot be 
consistently “duplicated” within any "sound formal system" of Arithmetic? 
We address this question, somewhat obliquely, in this paper, and briefly note some 
immediate consequences. We essentially prove that the recursive1 number-theoretic 
relation x=Sb(y 19|Z(y))2 - which is algorithmically verifiable since the recursive function 
Sb(y 19|Z(y)) is Turing-computable3 - cannot be introduced through definition in any 
consistent4 formal system of Arithmetic such as Gödel’s formal system P [Go31a], or 
standard PA5. 
We note that, in his seminal 1931 paper [Go31a], Gödel defines the recursive number-
theoretic function Sb(x 19|Z(y)) as the Gödel-number6 of the formula7, of his formal 
system P, that is obtained from the P-formula whose Gödel-number is x by substituting 
the numeral8 [y]9, whose Gödel-number is Z(y), for the variable whose Gödel-number is 
19 wherever the latter occurs free in the P-formula whose Gödel-number is x. 
                                                        
 
1 We follow Gödel’s definition of recursive number-theoretic functions and relations ([Go31a], p14-17). 
 
2 This relation occurs on 2nd August 2002 in the correspondence titled “The Godel’s Loop” between 
Antonio Espejo <CASAFARFARA@terra.es> and "Rupert" <rupertmccallum@yahoo.com> in the 
Google newsgroup sci.logic. 
 
3 We call a function F “Turing-computable” if, and only if, there is an algorithm U that computes F as 
defined by Mendelson ([Me64], p231). 
 
4 We take the classical definition of “consistency” as defined by Mendelson ([Me64], p37). 
 
5 We take standard PA to be the first order theory S defined by Mendelson ([Me64], p102), in which 
addition and multiplication are the standard interpretations of the primitive symbols “+” and “*” 
respectively. 
 
6 By the “Gödel-number” of a formula of P, we mean the natural number corresponding to the formula 
in the 1-1 correspondence defined by Gödel ([Go31a], p13). 
 
7 By “formula”, we shall henceforth mean a “well-formed formula” as defined by Gödel ([Go31a], p11). 
 
8 We follow Gödel’s definition of a numeral ([Go31a], p10). 
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1 A Meta-theorem of recursive asymmetry 
Definition: A recursive number-theoretic function or relation is asymmetrical in P if it is 
not the standard interpretation10 of any of its formal representations11 in P. 
Meta-theorem 1: There is a recursive number-theoretic relation that is asymmetrical in P.  
Proof: We consider the number-theoretic relation x=Sb(y 19|Z(y)). 
(a) We assume that no recursive number-theoretic function or relation is asymmetrical 
in P. In other words, we assume that every recursive number-theoretic function or 
relation is the standard interpretation of at least one of its formal representations in 
P. 
(b)  Let the P-formula [F(x, y)] denote a formal representation of the recursive 
number-theoretic relation x=Sb(y 19|Z(y)). 
(c) Let F(x, y) denote the standard interpretation12 of [F(x, y)]. 
(d) We consider the case where x=Sb(y 19|Z(y)) is an abbreviation13 for F(x, y). In 
other words, we assume that, if we use Gödel’s recursive definitions ([Go31a], 
                                                                                                                                                                   
9 Henceforth, we use square brackets to differentiate between a formula [R(x)] and its interpretation R(x) 
under some given interpretation, say M, where we follow Mendelson’s definition of “interpretation” 
([Me64], p48, §2). We note that the interpreted relation R(x) is obtained from the formula [R(x)] by 
replacing every primitive, undefined symbol of P in the formula [R(x)] by an interpreted mathematical 
symbol under the interpretation M (i.e. a symbol that is a shorthand notation for some, semantically 
well-defined, concept of classical mathematics under the interpretation M). So, assuming the given 
interpretation M follows standard logical terminology, the P-formula [(Ax)R(x)] would interpret as the 
M-proposition (Ax)R(x), and the P-formula [~(Ax)R(x)] as the M-proposition ~(Ax)R(x). 
 
10 We follow Mendelson’s definition of “standard interpretation” ([Me64], p107). 
 
11 We follow Mendelson’s definitions of “expressibility” ([Me64], p117), and “representability” ([Me64], 
p118), of number-theoretic functions and relations in a formal system such as P. 
 
12 By definition, F(x, y) is some interpretation of the P-formula [F(x, y)]. 
 
13 Cf. ([Go31a], p11, footnote 22); ([Me64], p31, footnote 1); ([Me64], p82). 
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p17-20), and follow the reasoning he outlines in Theorem V ([Go31a], p23), we 
can transform the relation x=Sb(y 19|Z(y)) into a relation F(x, y), such that all  
the symbols that occur in F(x, y) are standard interpretations of primitive symbols 
of P. 
Now: 
(i) Let k be the Gödel-number of [F(x, y)]. 
(ii) Then Sb(k 19|Z(k)) is the Gödel-number of the P-formula [F(x, k)] that we get 
when, in the P-formula [F(x, y)], we replace the variable [y], wherever it occurs, 
by the numeral [k].  
(We assume that [y] is Gödel-numbered as 1914 in the Gödel-numbering that yields 
k as the Gödel-number of [F(x, y)]) 
(iii) Let l= Sb(k 19|Z(k)).  
(iv) By definition, the instantiation of the number-theoretic function Sb(y 19|Z(y)), 
whose abbreviation is Sb(k 19|Z(k)), must contain an explicit bound k' that is 
equal to, or larger than, l.  
This follows from the constructive definition of Gödel’s recursive functions 
([Go31a], p17, footnote 34). Thus Sb(y 19|Z(y)) is of the form “(ix)((x =< f1(y)) 
& g1(x, y))”, where “f1(y)” and “g1(x, y)” are abbreviations, for a recursive 
function and a recursive relation, respectively, of lower rank ([Go31a], p16, 
Theorem IV). Similarly, f1(y) is of the form “(ix)((x =< f2(y)) & g2(x, y))”, etc. 
                                                        
 
14 Following the convention set by Gödel in Theorems V and VI (cf. [Go31a], p22, footnote 38), we 
assign 17 as the Gödel-number of “x”, and 19 as the Gödel-number of “y”. 
 5
(Here, “(ix)R(x)” denotes the smallest natural number for which the relation R(x) 
holds, and “=<” denotes the relation of “equal to or less than”.) 
We thus have a finite sequence f1(y), f2(y), ..., fn(y) of recursive functions, of 
decreasing rank, such that: 
Sb(y 19|Z(y)) =< f1(y) =< f2(y) =< ... =< fn(y), 
where n is less than or equal to the rank r of Sb(y 19|Z(y)), and where fn(y) does 
not contain any abbreviations. 
It follows that fn(y) occurs, as a bound, in the unabbreviated number-theoretic 
function whose abbreviation is Sb(y 19|Z(y)). By Gödel’s reasoning, as outlined in 
Theorem V, fn(y) is, therefore, either a constant, or of the form “y+q” ([Go31a], 
p23), where q is a natural number that depends on the rank r of Sb(y 19|Z(y)).  
(We note that the representation of fn(y) in P, as envisaged in Theorem V, would 
be Gödel’s term of the first type ([Go31a], p10), denoted by [Sqy], where ‘Sq’ 
denotes the pre-fixing of the primitive (successor) symbol [S]15 of P, to [y], q 
times.) 
We thus have that: 
l = Sb(k 19|Z(k)) =< fn(k) = k'. 
(v) Since the standard interpretation of [F(x, k)] is F(x, k), it follows, from (d), that 
F(x, k) is the number-theoretic relation whose abbreviation is x= Sb(k 19|Z(k)). 
                                                        
 
15 We note that Gödel uses the symbol “f” instead of “S” in his paper [Go31a]. 
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(vi) By (iv), [F(x, k)] must, therefore, contain a bound [k'], which interprets as a 
natural number k' that is larger than l.  
This is impossible, since a formula cannot contain a numeral that, under interpretation, 
yields a natural number that is equal to, or larger than, the Gödel-number of the 
formula16. It follows that assumption (a) does not hold; this proves the meta-theorem. 
2 Some consequences 
(a) It now follows that: 
Meta-lemma 1: We cannot introduce a finite number of arbitrary recursive number-
theoretic functions and relations as primitive symbols into P without risking 
inconsistency. 
Proof: Adding “Sb”, and a finite number of other functions and relations in terms of 
which it is defined ([Go31a], p17-19, Defs. 1-31), as new primitive symbols of P, 
along with associated defining axioms (cf. [Me64], p82 , §9), would yield a formal 
system P' in which [x=Sb(y 19|Z(y))] is a P'-formula. By Meta-theorem 1, P' would 
be inconsistent. 
(b) It further follows that: 
                                                        
16 This is easily proved since, following, for instance, Gödel’s assignment of the natural numbers 1 and 
3 to the primitive P-symbols [0] and [S] respectively ([Go31a], p13), we have that: 
 
(i)  the Gödel number p13 p23 ... pq3 pq+1 of the numeral [S
q0], which represents the natural number q in 
P, is greater than q for all q >= 0, where pi is the i’th prime; 
 
(ii) for any P-formulas [F] and [G], the Gödel number of the concatenated P-formula [FG] is always 
greater than, or equal to, the individual Gödel numbers of the P-formulas [F] and [G]. 
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Meta-lemma 2: Although a recursive number-theoretic relation, and the standard 
interpretation of its formal representation, are always equivalent in their 
instantiations, they are not always formally equivalent. 
Proof: Let F(x1,  ..., xn) be any recursive number-theoretic relation, and G(x1,  ..., 
xn) be the standard interpretation of one of its formal representations in P.  
We thus have that the two relations are equivalent in their instantiations since, by 
definition, for any given sequence <a1,  ..., an> of natural numbers: 
F(a1,  ..., an) holds if and only if G(a1,  ..., an) holds. 
However, by Meta-lemma 1, it follows that [F(x1,  ..., xn)] is not necessarily a P-
formula. Hence, we cannot conclude that: 
[F(x1,  ..., xn) <=> G(x1,  ..., xn)] is a P-formula. 
This proves the lemma17. 
(c) Can every recursive number-theoretic function or relation be defined constructively 
within P? The classical argument is expressed by Mendelson ([Me64], p82, §9): 
“In mathematics, once we have proved, for any y1, ..., yn, the existence of a unique 
object u having the property A(u, y1, ..., yn), we often introduce a new function f(y1, 
..., yn) such that A(f(y1, ..., yn), y1, ..., yn) holds for all y1, ..., yn. ... It is generally 
acknowledged that such definitions, though convenient, add nothing really new to the 
theory.” 
                                                        
 
17 We note that Gödel asserts at the end of his Theorem VII that the equivalence in Meta-lemma 2 can 
always be formulated within the formal system P ([Go31a], p31). 
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More precisely, he argues, in his Proposition 2.29 ([Me64], p82), that, classically, 
abbreviations for strongly representable ([Me64], p118) number-theoretic functions may 
be introduced as primitive symbols into P, since they can always be eliminated. It follows 
that: 
Meta-lemma 3: If every strongly representable number-theoretic function can be 
introduced as a new function letter into P, without affecting the consistency of P, 
then every recursive function is not strongly representable18 in P. 
(d) We also note that every arithmetical relation is the standard interpretation of one of its 
representations in a formal system of Arithmetic such as standard PA. Since Meta-Lemma 1 
can be seen to hold in any such system, it follows from Meta-lemma 2 that: 
Meta-lemma 4: Although every primitive recursive relation is equivalent to some 
arithmetical relation, in the sense that they are always equivalent in their 
instantiations, such equivalence cannot be formulated within a formal system of 
Arithmetic such as standard PA. 
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